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India’s National Interests 
and Diplomatic Activism: 
Towards Global Leadership?
 Oliver Stuenkel
India’s rise constitutes one of the most fascinating and important stories of the past two decades, symbolising, along with China, the fundamental shift of power towards Asia. Yet 
while many acknowledge India’s newfound importance, the country remains one of the most 
misunderstood actors in the international community. During the Cold War, India was the only 
democratic regime that did not align with the West. After becoming a nuclear power in 1998, 
the country suffered international condemnation, only to become one of the United States’ key 
strategic partners less than ten years later. While international analysts have traditionally looked 
at India primarily through the prism of the confl ict with Pakistan, today it is routinely analysed 
in the context of a rising China. Neither viewpoint can do justice to India’s much more important 
and complex role in the 21st century. The need to understand India’s perspective has never been 
greater, and today no global challenge – be it climate change, nuclear proliferation or poverty 
reduction – can be tackled successfully without India’s active contribution and engagement.
THE INDIAN PARADOX
India’s role in today’s international context abounds with paradox. At fi rst sight, there are many reasons 
to be optimistic about India: it boasts one of the world’s most dynamic economies, driven by a growing 
group of sophisticated entrepreneurs capable of competing globally. India has experienced unprecedented 
growth and stability since the end of the Cold War, and it is expected to turn into one of the world’s 
fi ve largest economies by the end of the decade. Given that the country fi nally seems to be capitalising 
on its potential, several analysts have proclaimed the ‘Indian Century’, and the government is ever 
more confi dent in its claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and more responsibility in 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. At the same time, India 
has become the world’s largest arms importer, further boosting its profi le and potential role in security 
affairs in the Indian Ocean. Due to its democratic credentials and reputation as a benign international 
actor, a consensus has emerged in the West that India is the world’s best hope to balance a rising China 
both in the region and, at a later stage, in global affairs. Refl ecting this, the United States’ recognition 
of India as a nuclear power, a move that risked weakening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was 
unprecedented and showed how important India has become in the view of foreign policy makers in 
Washington D.C. On top of all that, India boasts of considerable soft power – its vibrant democracy, 
millennia-old culture and benevolent standing help explain why the vast majority of international actors 
look kindly upon India’s rise.
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However, India’s global aspirations are starkly 
contrasted by the enormous diffi culties it faces both 
at home and outside of its borders. With over 300 
million Indians living below the poverty line and 
growing economic inequalities, India’s rise has yet 
to translate into tangible benefi ts for the poor, most 
of whom live in rural areas that have benefi tted little 
from recent economic growth. The Maoist Naxalite 
insurgency, affecting large swathes of the country, 
has rightly been identifi ed by the government as 
India’s most serious security concern. Violence saps the 
government’s authority to take the country forward in 
these areas. Yet the insurgents’ continued presence 
can be explained precisely because growth has not 
been suffi ciently distributive. More importantly for 
India’s foreign policy, Kashmir represents a bleeding 
wound that signifi cantly diverts foreign policy makers’ 
attention, reducing their capacity to focus on other 
urgent challenges. Furthermore, it constrains India’s 
armed forces’ ability to deal with regional security 
challenges more effectively, given that many are 
stationed along its disputed borders. Recent analyses 
have laid bare New Delhi’s dysfunctional national 
security machinery, in which decision makers spend 
more time on internal procurement processes and 
battling bureaucracy than on developing foreign 
policy strategies, reducing India’s capacity to pursue 
its strategic objectives effectively. A political deadlock, 
a historic protest movement (led by Anna Hazare) and 
a severe leadership crisis in government (caused by 
Sonia Gandhi’s prolonged absence) further complicate 
Manmohan Singh’s attempts to strengthen India’s 
role in the world.
INDIA’S REGIONAL PROBLEM
India’s biggest weakness is its incapacity to exercise 
regional leadership – far from articulating a clear 
and attractive vision for the region, India remains a 
reactive force that lacks the initiative to propose bold 
projects such as, for example, the creation of a pan-
South Asian energy grid. Despite a strong focus on 
Pakistan, India wields virtually no infl uence over the 
– admittedly unpredictable – government in Islamabad. 
Intra-regional trade remains minimal, and India’s 
attempts to push for greater economic integration 
have repeatedly been frustrated. This is surprising as 
smaller neighbours such as Bangladesh could benefi t 
enormously from integrating economically with India. 
Yet India still struggles to overcome the disruptive 
effects of partition on the region – economic regions 
such as Kolkata-Bangladesh and Karachi-Mumbai 
were separated in 1947, and barriers between them 
remain formidable.
Given this unique set of contrasting indicators, how can 
we characterise India’s role in the world? India’s foreign 
policy strategy has been unique from the outset and 
given the country’s peculiarities it is unlikely to adapt 
to outsiders’ expectations and adhere to traditional 
categories, continuously confounding, surprising and 
frustrating foreign observers – particularly those in the 
West. Jawaharlal Nehru’s early decision not to align 
with either the United States or the Soviet Union but 
to assert India as an independent pole in the Cold War 
international system may have seemed unorthodox 
at the time, yet today most analysts agree that it has 
served India well. After Nehru, Indian foreign policy 
followed a somewhat more realist orientation (from 
the mid-1960s to the late-1980s) before a fundamental 
reorientation after the end of the Cold War, forced by 
the loss of the Soviet Union as India’s most important 
partner and an acute fi nancial crisis that led to historic 
economic reforms. 
Indian exceptionalism pervades policy makers’ 
world view, and in foreign policy matters India 
generally seeks the moral high ground. This claim 
is strengthened by India’s singular achievement of 
building and defending a stable democracy amid 
extreme poverty, inequality and extreme diversity. 
Yet while the democratic character of its regime is an 
important ingredient of its foreign policy identity, it 
does not systemically promote democracy abroad. In 
1988, India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent Indian 
troops to the Maldives to avoid a coup d’état, helping 
the country’s democratically elected President reassert 
power, and India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
has argued that liberal democracy was the natural 
order of political organisation in today’s world, saying 
that all alternative systems were an aberration. Yet, at 
the same time, India has for over a decade followed 
a so-called ‘constructive engagement’ policy with 
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Myanmar’s military junta in which it has not criticised 
the regime’s human rights abuses even as it hosts 
large numbers of Burmese refugees and political 
exiles on its soil. Nor did New Delhi take much of 
a position one way or the other on the fraudulent 
elections held in Myanmar in 2010, disappointing 
pro-democracy activists. Raja Mohan has argued that 
democracy as a political priority is largely absent from 
India’s foreign policy – which may be partly explained 
by the fact that India is surrounded by unstable and 
often autocratic regimes, which may react negatively 
to democracy promotion. This ambiguity points to a 
more general debate about the role India should play 
in the region – what does regional leadership entail 
or require? Does the region represent a nuisance, an 
opportunity, a shield or a launching pad for a global 
role? Put differently, what is India’s ‘regional project’? 
The question of democracy promotion is but one, 
albeit an important one, of the challenges that derive 
from this larger question. 
CAN INDIA BE A GLOBAL POWER WITHOUT BEING 
A REGIONAL POWER?
Regarding the paradox of India’s global ambition 
and its diffi culty to establish itself as a leader in its 
backyard, there is a growing consensus that India 
simply cannot leapfrog problems in its vicinity to 
play on the world stage. Given that several of its 
neighbours are frequently hostile towards India, 
a regional backlash in the region could seriously 
undercut India’s global strategy. While India has in 
the past attempted to ignore its neighbourhood, even 
small neighbours such as Nepal and Sri Lanka have 
repeatedly demanded India’s attention, particularly 
when their political stability seemed at risk.
The Indian government has, as a reaction, undertaken 
a coordinated effort to engage with its region. While 
the scope for bold and substantive initiatives was 
limited during the Cold War, when India sought to 
economic autarky, its growing integration and weight 
in the world economy since the beginning of the 1990s 
gives it – in theory – suffi cient leverage to infl uence 
others. In addition, while India’s democracy had always 
enhanced its soft power, its lack of economic success 
limited its attractiveness. India’s approach to Bhutan 
is probably its most successful example of bilateral 
relationship with a neighbour, and could readily serve 
as a model for India’s ties to other small neighbours. 
India has provided Bhutan with generous economic 
aid since 1958, when Jawaharlal Nehru fi rst visited 
the country, yet India has always kept a low profi le 
in Bhutan, and the relationship has traditionally been 
marked by friendliness and mutual respect. 
The belief that India deserved a seat on the high table 
has informed India’s foreign policy since Nehru became 
India’s fi rst Prime Minister, with the difference that its 
recent economic success has made such desires seem 
much more realistic. Despite India’s newfound weight, 
there often remains a gap between India’s great-power 
identity and the way others see it, frequently resulting 
in frustrating negotiations. Yet Indian policy makers 
are struggling to defi ne how to use this leverage, 
since there is no consensus concerning the nature and 
scope of the Indian national interest. The last decade 
clearly indicates that India’s sphere of infl uence has 
grown considerably, explaining India’s strong presence 
in Afghanistan and its growing willingness to sign 
partnerships with other Asian actors such as Japan 
that are only thinly veiled initiatives to isolate China. 
Analysing India’s most important bilateral relationships 
sheds further light on how the country perceives itself.
IS ASIA BIG ENOUGH FOR TWO WORLD POWERS?
How will India-China ties develop? Whenever two 
rising powers sit next to each other, the chance for 
confl ict greatly increases as their spheres of infl uence 
grow quickly. This unfortunate constellation now 
becomes increasingly visible in Asia, where a rising 
China and a rising India have begun to claim infl uence 
over the same regions. After India and Vietnam agreed 
to jointly explore oil in the South China Sea, analysts in 
China accused India of interfering in a region where it 
did not belong. China is determined to create alliances 
with India’s neighbours such as Pakistan, where it 
is building a major port in Gwadar, a coastal city 
not far to the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time 
India has – to China’s dismay – begun to strengthen 
ties with Japan, Australia, and the United States. 
While trade between India and China is growing, 
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this alone  may not be enough to prevent an escalation, 
as analysts from both China and India have argued 
that one has attempted to ‘encircle’ the other. 
Six aspects make these trends particularly worrisome. 
First, China and India have been at war before – 
in 1962 – and the resulting border dispute is yet 
to be resolved. Second, Asia lacks strong regional 
institutions that could serve as a platform to resolve 
future problems (many exist already, ranging from 
issues around the Dalai Lama and Pakistan to the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group). Third, both countries are 
extremely resource-hungry and could soon clash over 
them in times of scarcity – a ‘race for resources’ is 
emerging between the two in oil-rich African states. 
Fourth, China and India will soon be the world’s 
fi rst and third largest economies, so any armed 
confl ict between the two would plunge the world 
into recession. Even more worrisome is that India 
has barely begun to expand its sphere of infl uence, 
so once its growth and economic interests reach 
Chinese dimensions, competition between India 
and China is set to intensify. Finally, both countries 
possess nuclear weapons, which points to potentially 
disastrous consequences for its combined 2.5 billion 
inhabitants – at the same time, nuclear weapons on 
both sides may create deterrence powerful enough 
to avoid armed confl ict. 
While the narrative of inevitable confrontation between 
Asia’s two rising powers is increasingly accepted in 
the West, and often visible in India’s media, there is 
a growing group of voices in New Delhi, such as The 
Hindu’s infl uential editor Siddarth Varadarajan, who 
see great potential for India and China to cooperate 
and engage in a mutually benefi cial partnership. Trade 
between the two has grown rapidly, albeit from a low 
base, and powerful industry representatives pressure 
the government in New Delhi to protect the Indian 
market from cheap Chinese imports. Multilaterally, 
India has repeatedly found common position with 
China, for example regarding climate change. Both 
India and China share an interest in combating 
radical Islamic terrorists, and both India and China 
seek to end Europe’s dominance in international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
INDIA – AFGHANISTAN
India’s ties to Afghanistan are an interesting case that 
shows how much more assertive India has become, 
and how it uses its economic weight to defend its 
national interest in the region. However, its ability to 
infl uence NATO decision makers on the ground is 
extremely limited, showing that the West does not 
yet regard India as strong enough to provide order 
in the region. Traditionally wary of growing Pakistani 
infl uence in Afghanistan, India supported the Northern 
Alliance during the Taliban regime, and was elated 
to see the United States defeat the Islamist regime 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11. India has 
strengthened its economic presence in Afghanistan, 
and its installations have several times been the 
target of terrorist attacks there, possibly planned 
in Pakistan. The looming NATO troop withdrawal 
presents India with a conundrum. While it is unwilling 
to deploy troops, which would run contrary to its 
non-intervention stance, Indian policy makers fear 
that Afghanistan will eventually become dependent 
on Pakistan, turning into a safe haven for terrorists 
and falling out of India’s orbit.
INDIA – PAKISTAN 
Regarding Pakistan, India faces a conundrum. Most 
Indians believe that a failed Pakistani state is not in 
India’s interest, as nuclear weapons could fall into the 
hands of radical Islamists. In addition, many believe 
that only a strong, stable and confi dent Pakistan would 
be able to negotiate a settlement with India, both 
regarding Kashmir and any other pending obstacles 
to better ties. At the same time, there is a strong 
aversion across many groups in India, including the 
armed forces, to providing material support for the 
Pakistani regime. While India stands to lose much 
more than Pakistan from a continued confl ict, very 
few voices – such as India’s former Consul General 
in Karachi Mani Shankar, who tirelessly calls for a 
rapprochement – provide bold and innovative ideas. 
China’s support of Pakistan (it provided Islamabad with 
nuclear technology in the 1990s) is set to continue, 
despite worries in Beijing about the growing number 
of radical Islamists emanating from Pakistan. While 
China remained neutral during the Kargil War in 1999, 
38
thus projecting considerable pragmatism, Beijing’s 
important role in India-Pakistan relations complicates 
an already diffi cult situation further. Barring any 
extraordinary event, we are therefore highly unlikely 
to see a settlement between Islamabad and New Delhi 
during this decade.
INDIA – UNITED STATES
In 2000, Condoleezza Rice, then foreign policy advisor 
to the Republican presidential candidate George W. 
Bush, identifi ed India as a ‘strategic partner’ and 
China as a ‘strategic competitor’. Five years later, the 
United States and India signed a nuclear agreement, 
a direct result of the United States’ belief that the 
United States could exploit an emerging rivalry 
between China and India. Yet if the United States 
had hoped to turn India into a reliable ally, it would 
be disappointed: throughout the negotiations with 
the United States, India maintained positive relations 
with Iran, strengthened ties to China, and disagreed 
with the United States on many other issues such 
as Myanmar and the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline. Despite these obvious signs, the United States 
will remain prone to both overestimating its capacity 
to infl uence India and to misunderstanding India’s 
desire to remain an independent actor. India sees 
itself as a global power and Indian voters are highly 
averse to any type of alliance that limits its room for 
maneuver.   Still, American and European efforts to 
court India are likely to grow, as became visible when 
President Obama openly supported India’s campaign 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 
India – something he failed to do for Brazil during his 
recent visit there.
INDIA’S MULTILATERAL RELATIONS
Despite India’s traditional focus on multilateralism 
and strong support of the United Nations during 
the Cold War, its performance on the multilateral 
level today is surprisingly thought to be less effective 
than in the bilateral realm. India’s performance in the 
G20, the IMF and the World Bank is widely thought 
to be exemplary – India’s ‘ﬁ nance diplomacy’ has 
been highly constructive, and after the G20 Summit 
in 2010 in Toronto, US President Obama admiringly 
spoke of Manmohan Singh’s economic competence, 
which had turned the Indian Prime Minister into a 
thought leader during the summit.  Yet in general, 
Indian negotiators are often seen as obstructionist, 
inﬂ exible and excessively tied to principles to make a 
compromise, fearing that ceding on any issue could 
be interpreted as weakness and confer a loss of 
respect or status. As several analysts have pointed 
out, Indian negotiators often focus more on tactics 
than on strategy, and negotiations are often seen as 
zero-sum games.   
CONCLUSION
Given India’s economic success over the past 
two decades, the country’s foreign policy makers 
increasingly need to confront the question of whether 
and how India will contribute to dealing with global 
challenges such as climate change, piracy, failed states 
and economic volatility. India’s growing might will 
fuel others’ expectation for India to engage in global 
burden sharing. Unless it is ready to do so, India risks 
losing the support of developing countries that have 
long formed the core of India’s followership, as they 
no longer see India defending poor countries’ interests 
at the international level. It constructive role in the 
G20 clearly shows that India does not have to be 
obstructionist. Instead of focusing on status, as it has 
often done in past decades, India’s foreign policy is 
likely to become more pragmatic. For example, rather 
than in engaging in ﬁ xed partnerships, India will pursue 
its national interest in its growing sphere of inﬂ uence, 
and align with whomever it deems convenient – be 
it other emerging countries such as Brazil in one 
moment, and the United States in the next. No country 
in the world, including China or the United States, will 
be capable of pressuring India into assuming a more 
responsible role – yet by the middle of this decade, 
India’s role is set to vastly exceed its current place in 
global politics. ■
